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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of climate-induced rising of ocean temperature on the optimal 
fishing policies in a two players’ non-cooperative game setting. We compare reactive 
management, under which the manager does not believe in or know about temperature trend, 
with proactive management where the manager considers the future temperature change in his 
decisions. We assume that the fish stock is initially solely owned by country one. As temperature 
rises, the stock starts spilling over to the zone of the other country and eventually becomes under 
its sole ownership. A stochastic dynamic programming model is developed to identify Nash 
management strategies for the two players. The main findings are that anticipation of 
temperature trend induces notable strategic interactions between two players. Knowing that it is 
gradually loosing the stock, country one is often harvesting more aggressively, whereas the 
country that is increasing its ownership harvests more conservatively. Compared to reactive 
management, proactive management benefits both parties in terms of their cumulative pay-offs; 
the biological stock is also larger much of the time. In most cases, the difference between two 
management regimes is subtle, but when the stock is slow-growing and highly schooling, 
proactive management may save it from collapse. 
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1 Introduction  
Climate change effect on the distribution of straddling stock is receiving increasing attention in 
international fishery management literature (Hannesson et al. 2006, Ekerhovd 2010). Climate 
model projections (IPCC, 2007) indicate that during the course of 21st century the surface 
temperature is likely to increase by 1.1° C – 6.4 °C. The atmospheric warming has significant 
effects, one of which is the increase of ocean temperatures, particular in the Arctic areas. The 
UK climate impact program (2002) predicted that mean annual surface temperatures in the 
North Sea will increase 0.5–1.0 °C by 2020, 1.0–2.5 °C by 2050, and 1.5–4.0 °C by 2080. For fish 
rising sea temperatures have profound effects both for their distribution and abundance 
(Cheung et al. 2009). For example, Perry et al. (2005) showed that in the North Sea, two thirds of 
the studied species had shown distributional responses to warming climate.  
Fish distribution shifts impose a new challenge on the management of commercial fish stocks 
(Hannesson 2007, Cochrane et al. 2009, Johnson and Welch 2010). Trans-boundary stocks are 
usually shared using the principle of ‘zonal attachment’ in which countries’ shares of the total 
quota are proportional to the proportion of the stock in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). 
Displacement of fish will threaten the stability of existing fish stock agreements. For example, 
consider a fish stock that is gradually moving from the jurisdiction of country A to the 
jurisdiction of country B. Country A will experience a shrinking stock within its own EEZ, hence 
its conservation incentive may decline. On the other hand, country B may lack conservation 
incentive as long as he is a minor player. Ignoring such dynamics may lead to overexploitation of 
an important resource. 
The problem of shifting zonal attachment in the climate change context was first examined by 
Hannesson (2007). The focal stock was assumed originally to be under sole ownership, and then 
over time, as temperature rises, start to ‘spill’ into the EEZ of another country. The two 
countries respond to the changes with a time lag and the management decisions are non-
cooperative. Managers in the model used by Hannesson make their decisions based on their 
past and current knowledge: their expectation about the future stock distribution is a weighted 
average of the previous year’s estimate and the currently observed split ratio. The optimal 
management decisions are based on the assumption that the current estimate of the stock 
distribution is representative of the future, as if there were no further change in the distribution. 
We define such manager as ‘reactive’.  
Our model builds upon Hannesson’s model (2007), but our managers can also be ‘proactive’ 
decision makers. We take this to mean that the manager takes into account both the current 
stock distribution as well as an anticipation of future distributional change of the stock. We used 
dynamic programming (DP) to find the optimal harvest policies at each time step. Proactive 
harvest decision making in absence of a trend in the stock distribution was studied by Golubtsov 
and McKelvey (2007) using a DP algorithm. In contrast to their paper, our split model integrates 
both rising temperature trend over time and stochastic uncertainty of future environment.  
3 
 
Capturing this rising trend is important for our study of the problem as it is the center piece of 
the climate change debates. Moreover, we also consider general forms of fish stock 
concentration profiles in order to reveal a more complete picture of the problem. The main 
research questions of our study are: How will managers’ belief about future temperature trend 
and the consequent distributional shift affect their harvest policies, and what are the 
implications of those decisions on the biological stock?  
2 Model Specification  
Solving problem of our interest requires a bio-economic model that combines both biological 
effects (stock dynamics in space and time) and economic effects (profit-maximizing harvest 
policy, constrained by the other player’s actions).  
2.1 The Biological Model 
We use a discrete-time logistic population growth model where stock renewal and harvesting 
alternate. During the part of a season when fishing takes place, the stock occupies the EEZs of 
two countries. Renewal is determined by the total biomass. 
2.1.1 Stock dynamics 
The discrete-time logistic growth function with harvesting is:  
𝑅(𝑠𝑡) = 𝑎𝑠𝑡(1 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝑠𝑡           (1) 
𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑡𝑅(𝑠𝑡) 
where   𝑅  is recruitment (i.e., the stock size before fishing), 𝑠𝑡 is the stock size after harvest, 𝑎 is 
the growth ratio (the greater the parameter, the faster the stock is renewed), and 𝑝𝑡 is the 
harvesting strategy, here expressed as the escapement proportion. We assume that stock size is 
expressed relative to the carrying capacity; this parameter thus dissappears in normalization.  
The fish stock we have in mind is a migratory stock that moves between spawning and fishing 
grounds (Figure 1). One implicit assumption of this model is that no fishing takes place during 
the reproductive season. 
During the fishing season, the harvestable stock 𝑅  may be found entirely in the EEZ of country 1 
or country 2, or split among the two, depending on the ocean temperature. The share of the 
harvestable stock in the EEZ of country 1 is given by parameter  𝜃𝑡, the split ratio; the rest spills 
into EEZ of country 2. Harvest takes place within the country’s own EEZ; each country decides its 
own harvest strategy, the proportion of fish 𝑝𝑡𝑖  to be left behind. As a result of harvesting, the 
stock size in country  𝑖 is reduced to 𝑠𝑡𝑖. Both streams of fish will then unite for renewal. Next 
season, the stock will then increase to a new level  𝑅𝑡+1 due to growth and reproduction of the 
fish left behind from previous season  𝑡. This so-called split stream model was first introduced by 
McKelvey and Golubtsov (2006). 
 
a=0.8 
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2.1.2 Stochastic split rule 
We assume the split ratio 𝜃 to be a function of temperature 𝑇, defined as follows:  
𝜃(𝑇) = � 1, 𝑇 < 𝑇1𝑇2 − 𝑇
𝑇2 − 𝑇1
, 𝑇1 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑇20 , 𝑇 > 𝑇2   .         (2) 
Here 𝑇1 and  𝑇2 are two temperature thresholds: below 𝑇1 country 1 is the sole owner of the 
stock; above  𝑇2, country 2 is the sole owner; in between, split ratio is a linear function of 
temperature as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Temperature change is determined by a trend parameter  𝛿, overlaid by annual stochastic 
fluctuations:    𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇0 + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑡(𝜇,𝜎)                (3 − 1)          𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿 + 𝑁(𝜇,𝜎)                (3 − 2)        
where 𝑇0  is the initial sea water temperature,  𝑡 is time and  𝑁(𝜇,𝜎)  is a normally distributed 
random variable with mean 𝜇 = 0 and standard deviation 𝜎. In all our simulations, we have 
chosen 𝜎 = 0.2°C,  𝑇0 = 10℃, 𝑇1 = 11℃ and 𝑇2 = 13℃. We have applied various values of  𝛿, 
ranging from 0.04 to 0.12℃/yr. Equation (3-1) and (3-2) specify two types of stochastic 
processes being used in our simulations. Equation (3-1) is often called white noise and equation 
(3-2) called colored noise, the difference of the two is whether temperature noise of this period 
is correlated with temperature noise of next period.  
2.2 The Economic Model 
In our model, two countries that share fish stock play a non-cooperative game over long time 
horizon. We assume that players are symmetric and omniscient: they have full knowledge about 
current state of the stock and temperature, and knowledge on the probability distribution of 
Figure 1:  The split stream game 
Figure 2:  Temperature and split rate: two 
thresholds, 11°𝐶/𝑦𝑟 and 13°𝐶/𝑦𝑟 
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stochastic uncertainty. Managers are assumed to be risk neutral. The countries are engaged in a 
dynamic multi-period game where they, each period, try to maximize their expected current and 
future payoff, constrained by the actions of the other country. Thus, the chosen harvest policies 
are Nash strategies. 
2.2.1 Revenue, cost and concentration profile 
For simplicity, we assume fish price to be exogenous and normalized to 1. Cost of fishing 
becomes then the vital variable for economic decisions. Fish stock density is critical in 
determining costs of fishing: the lower the density, the more effort is needed to catch a unit of 
fish. To describe how fish density experienced by fishermen depends on total stock abundance, 
Clark (1976, 1990) introduced the concept of concentration profiles. A concentration profile 
describes how average maximum density of fish depends on total stock abundance and is 
determined by spacing behavior of fish, i.e., by the degree of their schooling behavior; this will 
vary from species to species.  
Let us denote the effective stock density experienced by the manager 𝑖 at within-season time 𝜏, 
as 𝜌𝜏𝑖 , which is the function of instantaneous sub-stream stock size  𝑥𝜏𝑖  and split ratio 𝜃𝜏𝑖:  
𝜌𝜏
𝑖 = �𝑥𝜏𝑖
𝜃𝜏
𝑖�
𝑏 ,   𝑖 = 1,2         (4) 
Given the split stream game we specified in Figure 1, the two streams of stock will meet before 
a new round of the split stream game takes place. Since fishes do not respect country 
boundaries, at the beginning of each fish season, two countries must have the same stock 
density. This explains why equation (4) has been corrected for split ratio 𝜃𝜏𝑖. Following this 
reasoning, two countries shall initially face same per unit cost of catching fish. Over time within 
the season, their sub-stream densities start diverging if players have chosen different fishing 
policies.  
Choice of parameter 𝑏 is another complexity of equation (4). If  𝑏 = 0, density  𝜌 becomes a 
stock size independent constant. This would describe a fish species which is highly schooling and 
when fishermen can easily find these schools. Under such circumstances, both players face same 
cost per unit catch throughout the fishing season, until the stock is exhausted. 𝑏 = 1 is another 
special case where density is strictly proportional to the stock size; this could happen when the 
area of fish distribution is unchanged, but the density changes with stock size. In contrast to the 
former ‘super-schooling’ case, 𝑏 = 1 refers to non-schooling fish that are uniformly distributed, 
at least from the fishermen’s perspective. However, most of fish stocks behave between these 
extreme cases with  0 < 𝑏 < 1. Many papers in the literature assume either one or the other of 
the aforementioned special cases. In our model, we have used a more general form of the 
concentration profile to reveal a more complete picture. 
Having understood implications of fish density on the unit costs, we can now derive costs at 
season t which is denoted as  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡: 
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𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝜏 𝑑𝜏1
0
       (5) 
where  𝑐𝑒  is a fixed value for cost per unit effort and 𝐸𝜏  is total fishing effort at time 𝜏. For 
simplicity, seasonal discounting is ignored in equation 5. Effort 𝐸𝜏 is defined as function of 
instantaneous catch  𝐶𝜏 and catchability coefficient 𝑞, which tells how easy to catch that fish 
species: 
𝐸𝜏 = 𝐶𝜏𝑞 𝜌𝜏         (6) 
After solving equations 4, 5, and 6, we derive the total seasonal cost each player faces as follows 
(for details see the Appendix): 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑖 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝜃𝑡
𝑖  𝑐𝑒 
𝑞  (1 − 𝑏)𝑅𝑡1−𝑏 �1 − (𝑝𝑡𝑖)1−𝑏�, 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 1
−
𝜃𝑡
𝑖  𝑐𝑒
𝑞
log�𝑝𝑡𝑖� , 𝑏 = 1     , 𝑖 = 1,2   (7) 
Equation (7) implies that the greater the value b, the costlier it is to fish.  
The expression for seasonal rent is straightforward:  
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜃𝑡𝑖  𝑅𝑡 �1 − 𝑝𝑡𝑖�  , 𝑖 = 1,2                     (8) 
2.2.2 Multi-period profit maximization  
The objective of a risk neutral manager is to maximize the net present value, which comprises of 
two terms: immediate payoff at present season  𝑡, and discounted sum of all future expected 
payoffs. When 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 1, the immediate payoff 𝑣𝑡𝑖  is given by equation (9):  
𝑣𝑡
𝑖�𝑝𝑡
𝑖 ,𝜃𝑡𝑖 ,𝑅𝑡� = 𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡  �1 − 𝑝𝑡𝑖����������𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 (8) − 𝜃𝑡𝑖  𝑐𝑒 𝑞  (1 − 𝑏)  (𝑅𝑡)1−𝑏 �1 − (𝑝𝑡𝑖)1−𝑏 ������������������������
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  (7)        (9) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the total stock at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑡𝑖  is the harvest policy, subscript 𝑡 denotes the fishing 
season, superscript 𝑖 denotes the player; the equation when 𝑏 = 1 is determined similarly. At 
time 𝑡, the current stock level 𝑅𝑡 and the current temperature 𝑇𝑡 are known and exogenously 
determined, hence 𝜃𝑡𝑖  is also known, and the immediate payoff is then only the function of  𝑝𝑡𝑖  , 
the current harvest policy of player 𝑖. As for the future payoffs, when  𝑡 < 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥, it is the sum of 
expected payoffs from 𝑡 + 1 to terminal 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥  , conditional on his competitor’s harvest policies.  
The Bellman equation of the described problem is specified in equation (10) that is subject to 
initial state 𝑅𝑡0 = 𝑅0, a given parameter, and equation (1), the biological production function.  
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𝐌𝐚𝐱
𝑷𝑡
𝑖
 𝑉𝑡𝑖�ℙ𝒕𝒊�|ℙ𝑡−𝑖 = 𝑣𝑡𝑖�𝑝𝑡𝑖 ,𝑅𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡𝑖� |𝑡=𝑡0 �������������𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 + � 1(1 + 𝑟)𝑘−𝑡 𝐸(𝑣 𝑘𝑖𝑘=𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘=𝑡+1
)|𝑝𝑘−𝑖�������������������
𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠
  ,
𝑖 = 1,2 ; 𝑡 = 𝑡0, 𝑡0 + 1, … , 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥          (10) 
Here 𝑡0 indicates the present time and 𝑟 is the monetary discount rate. The manager’s objective 
at decision point 𝑡 is to choose the policy that maximizes the sum of his current payoff and all 
future expected payoffs, given the policy of his competitor. ℙ𝑡𝑖 = (𝑝𝑡𝑖 , … . 𝑝𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ), is a policy set, 
specifying the harvest policy player 𝑖 chooses each fishing season; ℙ𝑡−𝑖 is the policy set of his 
competitor. When 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥, the future payoff is set to an arbitrary value.  
In equation (10), current payoff is only the function of his own fishing policy, but the payoff at  
𝑘 = 𝑡 + 1 period, is both the function of his own policy at that period as well as the sub-stream 
stock of the period. The stock level at period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑅𝑡+1, is determined by two players’ fishing 
policies at period 𝑡, and its functional form is specified in equation (1).  
From equation (2) and (3), we know that  𝜃𝑡+1, the split ratio at time 𝑡 + 1, is a function of 
current temperature, the trend and temperature stochasticity,  𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑡 , 𝛿,𝜎). The proactive 
manager has full knowledge of the rising trend in temperature, and takes that into consideration 
in his decision making. The reactive manager does not consider future temperature change in 
his decision making, and he believes future split ratio to be the same as current split rate, or in 
other words, 𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑡 ,𝜎). Notice that both the reactive and proactive managers update their 
information about current temperature and thus split ratio of the stock. Their decision making  
diverges in the way they evaluate the expected future payoff, but not the current payoff.  
2.3 Dynamic Programming 
We apply dynamic programming (DP) in our model. The DP determines a Markov perfect 
equilibrium for dynamic recursive games. The simulations are divided into two parts: backward 
induction and forward induction. The backward induction is to search sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium for all combinations of stock, temperature and period, based on the manager’s 
belief about future change. Its temperature uncertainty follows white noise process (see 
equation 3-1). The forward induction simulates the assumed “real” temperature change in 
which temperature uncertainty follows random walk process (see equation 3-2). We also 
consider situations where the actual trend is stronger or weaker than the trend assumed by the 
managers in question. 
In addition to calendar time both players in the game condition their strategies on other 
variables such as stock level, the split ratios and competitor’s strategies, therefore the 
equilibrium we deal with is close-loop Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p510).  
A grid-based search algorithm on a 20 × 20 grid is used in identifying Nash equilibrium. While in 
most cases a unique, globally stable Nash solution can be found, in some cases no-Nash does 
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occur under certain circumstances. This gives interesting dynamics of the problem. More 
elaborations will be provided in a forthcoming paper.  
2.4 Simulations 
In all simulations, we assume two managers/countries in question are identical in terms their 
management regimes (reactive or proactive) and in the economic parameters (price of fish, cost 
of fishing effort, and discount rate). All figures presented below are mean trends of 500 
replicate forward runs. All the results are based on a setting where the fish stock is first under 
the sole ownership of country 1, then starts gradually spilling into the jurisdiction of country 2, 
until at some point it enters the sole ownership of country 2. With our standard parameters, 
spilling occurs with probability 50% or higher from year 10 to year 42; the stock is on average 
equally shared at year 26. 
3 Results and discussion 
To set the stage, we first describe the results under reactive management, before moving on to 
comparisons with proactive management, the main focus of this paper. 
3.1 Reactive management 
Under reactive management, the transition from the sole ownership of country 1 to the sole 
ownership of country 2 is marked by a U-shaped “notch” pattern in the abundance trajectory of 
the biological stock (figure 3). Before the stock starts spilling to partial ownership of country 2, 
the sole owner, player 1, fishes the stock to the optimal level that maximizes his expected net 
returns, without anticipation of changes in the ownership. Amid the transition the stock is 
exploited to a low level because of the non-cooperative harvest. Most of the time, the minor 
owner harvests more aggressively than the major owner who has more incentive to maintain 
the stock at a productive level; the minor owner can free-ride the major owner’s conservation 
effort. The low-point of the stock abundance is reached in the middle of transition when neither 
player is the major owner. The stock starts gradually recovering when player 2 gains a major 
share of the stock; ex-post the transition, single-owner optimum is again reached. These findings 
echo the conclusions of Hannesson (2007). 
The trajectory of stock decline and recovery is almost symmetric under reactive management: 
decisions that country 1 makes as the majority player are similar to those that country 2 does in 
the same position; some differences do exist, however, because the asymmetry in stock 
dynamics: stock size can decline arbitrarily fast, whereas it can only increase in abundance at a 
finite rate. 
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3.2 Reactive vs. proactive management 
Based on our definition of these two management regimes, we can anticipate that under 
proactive management, the dominant player will realize in advance that the stock is slipping out 
of his territory, therefore reacting faster. Similarly the minor player will know in advance that he 
is taking over the stock. For proactive management, under which future temperature change is 
allowed to influence current harvest policy, the knowledge about the future makes the roles of 
country 1 and country 2 inherently different. 
3.2.1 Implication on stock and payoff 
Figure 4 shows two representative examples of the development of total stock over time under 
reactive and proactive management regimes. The right panel illustrates the more typical case: 
there is no qualitative difference between the two management regimes. The stock ex-ante and 
ex-post transition is at the same level regardless of which management regime applies. Some 
divergence appears during the ownership transition. We can notice some characteristic features. 
First, in the beginning of the transition, the stock declines earlier, but it also starts to recover 
earlier amid the transition. Second, when compared to reactive management, the stock 
trajectory under proactive management becomes more conspicuously asymmetric, largely 
because the stock recovers faster. 
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Figure 3: Mean trends (500 runs) of total stock level and harvest policies under 
reactive management. Parameters: a=0.4, b=0.5, r=6%, trend=0.08 °𝐶/𝑦𝑟 , 
sigma=0.2°𝐶/𝑦𝑟 nbins=20 sbins=20, tbins=30; R0=0.6,T0=10°𝐶/𝑦𝑟 
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The left panel shows the less typical case where reactive and proactive management yield 
qualitatively different outcomes. This can happen when the stock in question has a slow growth 
and high schooling tendency (here 𝑎 = 0.3 and 𝑏 = 0.1). As Figure 4 shows the reactive 
management results in a stock collapse, while the proactive management under the same 
conditions is able to avoid such tragedy. This does not imply proactive management is risk-free, 
but it does show that reactive management is more vulnerable to the negative consequences of 
non-cooperative exploitation.  
In terms of the flow of immediate payoff (Figure 4), the proactive management brings slightly 
higher cumulative payoffs (excluding the first and the last period) for both players than the 
reactive management; the difference becomes large only when the stock collapses under 
reactive management. We see that it is country 1 that gains higher payoffs (because he benefits 
more from fishing the stock down), but that country 2 benefits more from the proactive 
management. 
3.2.2 Strategic interactions 
A comparison of the two players’ optimal policies under the alternative management regimes 
(figure 5) helps to understand the mechanisms behind the observed differences in stock 
trajectories. As the stock starts to spill to the jurisdiction of country 2, we observe that proactive 
management induces strategic interactions between two players. Summarizing figure 5, we can 
distinguish four phases characterized by different interactions: 
During the first phase, country 1 harvests a higher proportion of his stock under proactive 
regime compared to reactive regime. This is understandable because country 1 is gradually 
losing the stock, hence he has less incentive to conserve it for the future. In contrast, there is no 
discernible policy change for country 2. This happens because during the early stage of the 
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Figure 4: Total stock level under proactive and reactive management: mean trends (500 runs) r=6%, 
trend=0.08°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, Initial stock R0=0.6, initial temperature T0=10°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑖 and 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 are the profit 
flows summing from period 2 to 49 respectively under proactive and reactive management .  
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transition, country 2’s policy is entirely governed by maximizing current payoffs: country 2’s 
conservation efforts would primarily benefit the major owner, and the time of gaining the major 
ownership is still far away. Country 2 is essentially a free-rider, and predicting the future 
correctly has no bearing for its policy (Figure 5). The stock responds to the increased total 
harvest under proactive management by declining earlier compared to reactive management.  
During phase two, lasting until about the middle of the transition, country 2 starts to harvest 
more conservatively under proactive management compared to reactive management. This 
happens because its policy choices start to reflect also the future value of the stock: country 2’s 
policy starts impacting the total stock significantly and he can expect to become the major 
benefactor of his own conservation efforts when he eventually is becoming the major stock 
owner. Nevertheless, country 2 is still free-riding on country 1’s conservation efforts, albeit less 
so than before. Country 1’s policy during this period is more varied. Most of the time he is 
harvesting similarly or less under the proactive compared to reactive management. Reduced 
harvest can occur because the stock is smaller and because country 2’s increased conservation 
incentive allows reaching a Nash equilibrium characterized by less intensive competition. The 
net effect of reduced harvest by country 2 and possibly by country 1 too is that the stock decline 
is halted and it may even start to recover slowly.  
  
 
Phase three is characterized by consistent differences between proactive and reactive 
management. Country 1 becomes the minor stock owner and increases his harvest ratio as he 
no longer would be the main benefactor of his conservation efforts; also, saving stock for the 
future pays off less and less as his stakes are diminishing. In contrast, country 2 maintains his 
more conservative policy: it is in his interest to allow the stock to gradually rebuild towards 
more productive levels. This may even involve no fishing at all for a period, echoing Clark’s 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Equal stock share
a=0.4,b=0.5
Periods
H
ar
ve
st
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 
 
React1
React2
Proact1
Proact2
Figure 5: Proactive vs. reactive management: policy dynamics (mean trends of 500 runs):  a=0.4, 
b=0.5, r=6%, trend=0.08°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, sigma=0.2°𝐶/𝑦𝑟 nbins=20, sbins=20, tbins=30; initial stock R0=0.6; 
initial temperature T0=10°𝐶. 
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finding (1990) that the single owner’s optimal strategy is to reach the optimal stock level at the 
quickest possible pace. Consequently, the stock is recovering quickly. 
Finally, during the last phase, in the end of transition, the minor owner’s policy is shaped by 
immediate profit maximization and becomes indistinguishable between proactive and reactive 
management. Country 2 is approaching sole ownership and can take advantage of the rebuilding 
of the stock, consequently, it can often harvest more intensively under proactive than under 
reactive management.  
3.2.3 Effect of stock growth, concentration profile and discount rate 
Figure 6 summarizes the influence of two biological key parameters in the model, growth 
ratio  (𝑎)  and concentration profile (𝑏) . The minimum stock level during the ownership 
transition ends up higher if the value of a and/or b is greater. The greater  𝑎 is, the faster stock 
can recover from overexploitation. The mechanism behind the effect of b is different: a high 
value of b implies the stock is a low-schooling one and costly to fish if stock level is low, it is then 
the high exploitation costs that has prevented stock from being over exploited. 
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Figure 6: Proactive management: sensitivity tests: trend=0.08°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, nbins=20 sbins=20, tbins=30; R0=0.6 ,T0=10°𝐶/𝑦𝑟. In the legend, pro=proactive,rea=reactive.  
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 The described four-phase strategic interactions (section 3.2.2) resulting from correct prediction 1 
of temperature trend persists across our simulations, though with some variations. However, 2 
increase in b has tendency of diminishing player 1’s conservation incentive during phase 2. This 3 
result is intuitive because if fishing down a small stock gets harder and costlier, player 1’s 4 
conservation efforts during phase 2 will not be paid off during phase 3. Actually, the more player 5 
1 conserves at phase 2 (and when he is still the main owner) affects remarkably the asymmetry 6 
of proactive stock trajectory, as well as the level of stock divergence between two management 7 
regimes.  8 
As discussed in section 3.2.1, proactive management can reduce, but not eliminate, risk of stock 9 
collapse (figure 6). This happens primarily because country 2 has increased incentive to conserve 10 
the stock under proactive management. 11 
The effect of discount rate (𝑟) is trivial in our simulation. A low r implies that the manager value 12 
future payoff, hence he tends to spread his harvest more over time. Correspondingly, we 13 
observe that the stock level is higher throughout when discount rate is lower, other things being 14 
equal.   15 
3.3 Prediction of correct temperature trend  16 
Until now, we have assumed that the proactive managers have accurate knowledge about the 17 
future temperature trend (this issue does not arise under reactive management). This is clearly 18 
unrealistic as there are great uncertainties in predictions for future temperature increase. 19 
Therefore we need to evaluate what is the influence of using an incorrect estimate of 20 
temperature change.  21 
With proactive management, predicting correct trend matters but in a subtle way: predicting a 22 
slower trend than the real one(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑤𝑑 = 0.04°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑤𝑑 = 0.08°𝐶/𝑦𝑟) leads to a 23 
harvest policy lagging behind the optimal one; while an over-prediction of temperature trend 24 (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑤𝑑 = 0.12°𝐶/𝑦𝑟, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑤𝑑 = 0.08°𝐶/𝑦𝑟) will lead to a harvest policy that is ahead of 25 
the optimal one (figure 7). In the former case, underestimation of future gain makes player 2 26 
less motivated to conserve stock when he is the minor owner; similarly, underestimating future 27 
stock loss, player 1 catches less fish than he in the optimal case could do after becoming minor 28 
player. It is worth noting that trend parameter does not affect equilibrium stock level ex-ante 29 
and ex-post transition, as it does to the minimum stock level.  30 
15 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
4 Conclusions 4 
Our model has attempted to simulate how climate warming induced stock displacement affects 5 
international fishery management based on annually updated harvest policies. The presented 6 
split stream model certainly is a simplified version of the reality, but it does capture some 7 
essential characteristics of some migratory stocks.  8 
Warming induces fish stock spilling from one country to another, and this may challenge existing 9 
management agreements. For example, mackerel was earlier an occasional visitor to Icelandic 10 
waters, but it has in recent years become abundant enough to support a sizeable commercial 11 
fishery (ICES 2010). This is problematic in the international context because Iceland is not a 12 
coastal state for mackerel, not part of the agreed management plan, and its fishery is not 13 
accounted for in the quota regulation.  14 
Responding to climate-induced gradual shift of stock ownership, reactive and proactive 15 
management trigger different policy dynamics: 16 
• With reactive management, the main owner has a stronger conservation incentive than 17 
the minor owner who can free-ride the main owner’s conservation efforts; consequently, 18 
the main owner harvests a lower proportion of his stock than the minor owner. In this 19 
case, two countries behave symmetrically.  20 
• With proactive management, the roles of two countries become inherently asymmetric. 21 
When country 1 is the major owner but anticipates loosing the stock, it harvests more 22 
intensively than when it has no information about diminishing stock share. When 23 
country 2 is the major owner, and even for some time before, it knows that the future 24 
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Figure 7: Prediction of correct trend: mean trends (500 runs) of total stock level 
under proactive management: discount rate r=6%, trend unit is  °𝐶/𝑦𝑟 , initial stock 
R0=0.; initial temperature T0=10°𝐶 
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will be even more in his favor, and it is in his best interests to recover the stock as quick 1 
as possible becomes his dominant strategy. At this stage, country 1 may become very 2 
aggressive because he knows that the stock is disappearing from his territory for good 3 
and he is enjoying the last chances to exploit the stock. 4 
In comparison to the noticeable changes in harvest policies caused by shift of management 5 
regime from reactive to proactive, the impact of regime shift on total stock level and cash flows 6 
is more subtle. Short decision cycle and slow temperature trend only explain part of the story. 7 
More importantly, strategic responses of two countries under proactive management to a 8 
certain degree compensate each other, helping to mitigate the effects on stock and payoff. 9 
Worth noting is that anticipation of the change in ownership does not change the most 10 
prominent feature of the harvest policies of a shared stock: the main owner conserves more 11 
than the minor one, and the minor owner tends to free ride the main owner’s conservation 12 
efforts. Nevertheless, proactive management benefits the stock and both of the players. These 13 
benefits mostly originate from the former minor owner’s anticipation of increasing stakes in the 14 
stock, and hence, increased incentives for less competitive and more sustainable harvest. This 15 
benefits the stock and also the player who is losing the stock. 16 
17 
17 
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Appendix 1: fishing costs and concentration profile 1 
Let 𝐶𝑡𝑖 be the catch rate of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The expression can be written as following:   2 
𝐶𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑖
∆𝑡
 
where 𝜃𝑡𝑖 is the split ratio at season 𝑡 for country 𝑖, 𝑅𝑡 is total stock before harvesting at season t, 3 
𝑠𝑖 is the stock size in country 𝑖 after harvesting. ∆𝑡 is the time span, equal to 1 in the model. We 4 
assume that a uniform catch rate is maintained within a season. 5 
Total catch during season 𝑡 then becomes:  6 
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑡
𝑖 = � 𝐶𝜏𝑖  𝑑𝜏 = 𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑖1
0
     (1) 
The stock (𝑥) change over time t in a country can be written as following: 7 
𝑥𝜏
𝑖 = 𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡 − 𝜏 ∗ 𝐶𝑡𝑖                             (2) 
The concentration profile 𝜌 is the function of biomass or stock 𝑥: 8 
𝜌�𝑥𝜏
𝑖� = �𝑥𝜏𝑖
𝜃𝑡
𝑖�
𝑏 ,   𝑖 = 1,2                            (3) 
where 𝑏 is a non-negative parameter, 𝑥𝑡𝑖  is sub-stream stock size(or biomass) in country 𝑖. If b=1, 9 
it indicates stock is uniformly distributed and reducing the stock will not affect fish distribution 10 
area but the density; If b=0, it shows stock density is constant, representing stock of super 11 
schooling type. In our model, we look at a more general case with 0 < 𝑏 < 1. 12 
Total effort by country 𝑖 at period 𝑡 is 𝐸𝑡𝑖: 13 
𝐸𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐶𝑡𝑖
𝑞𝜌�𝑥𝑡
𝑖�
                              (4)   14 
where 𝑞 is the catch-ability, a parameter indicating how easy to catch certain fish species.   15 
𝑝𝑡
𝑖  is the escapement proportion, a decision variable, indicating what proportion of fish in his 16 
stream that the manager of country 𝑖 decides to leave behind at season t: 17 
𝑝𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡𝑖
𝜃𝑡
𝑖𝑅𝑡
                                     (5) 
Now we can derive the function for total costs in season  𝑡: 18 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑖 = � 𝑐𝑒𝐸𝜏𝑖𝑑𝜏1
0
= 𝑐𝑒
𝑞
�
𝐶𝜏
𝑖
𝜌 (𝑥𝜏𝑖)𝑑𝜏10 = 𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑒(𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑹𝒕 − 𝑠𝑡𝑖)𝑞 ∆𝑡 � (𝑥𝑡𝑖)−𝑏𝑑𝑡10        (6)   
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Where 𝑐𝑒 is the cost per unit of effort, assuming a constant parameter and same for both 1 
countries in game. 2 
We know that:  3 
� (𝑥𝜏𝑖)−𝑏𝑑𝜏1
0
= �𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡�1−𝑏 − 𝑠𝑡𝑖1−𝑏
𝐶𝑡
𝑖  (1 − 𝑏) = �𝜃𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑡�1−𝑏(1 − 𝑝𝑡𝑖1−𝑏)𝐶𝑡𝑖  (1 − 𝑏)   (7) 
Plug equation (5) and (7) into equation (6), we obtain total seasonal cost function for country 𝑖 : 4 
𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒕
𝒊 = 𝜽𝒕𝒊  𝒄𝒆 𝑹𝒕𝟏−𝒃(𝟏−𝒑𝒕𝒊𝟏−𝒃)
𝒒  (𝟏−𝒃)      𝟎 < 𝑏 < 1  , 𝐢 = 𝟏,𝟐                (𝟖) 5 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   6 
